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Abstract
We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from
a series of industries when the ￿rms￿abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism
in which the regulator asks ￿rms to report their abatement costs and implements the most
stringent emissions standard consistent with the ￿rms￿declarations. He also inspects one of
the ￿rms in each industry which declared the cost structure consistent with the least stringent
emissions standard and with an arbitrarily small probability, he discovers whether the report
was true or not. The ￿rm is punished with an arbitrarily small ￿ne if and only if its report was
false.
This mechanism is simple, is implementable in practice, its unique equilibrium is truth
telling by ￿rms, it implements the ￿rst best pollution standards and shares some features of the
regulatory processes actually observed in reality.
Keywords: E¢ cient Emissions Standards, Command and Control, Truth Telling, Full Nash
Implementation.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi￿cation numbers: D02, D78, D82, Q20, Q52, Q53.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given
pollutant from a series of industries. He wants ￿rms to produce the optimal amount of pollution,
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1when both the ￿rms￿abatement costs and the costs of pollution to society are considered. Such a
regulator faces a fundamental problem faced by every regulator worldwide: that he rarely knows
the exact nature of the pollution abatement technology of ￿rms, which of course in￿ uences the
optimal pollution level to be chosen. The regulator must therefore rely on whatever he can learn
about ￿rms￿costs from the information they are willing to provide. Given the importance of the
problem of regulating polluters, the issue of how to truthfully extract information about their costs
has been at the heart of both academic and policymaking discussions for almost three decades.
We posit a model in which the regulator asks ￿rms to declare what their cost functions are and
uses these announcements to set an emissions standard for each industry: a maximum allowable level
of emissions for every ￿rm in that industry. After receiving the reports, the regulator implements
in each industry the most stringent standard consistent with the declarations of the ￿rms in that
industry. He also inspects one of the ￿rms in each industry which declared the cost structure
consistent with the least stringent emissions standard (the ￿rms most likely to be lying). With an
arbitrarily small probability, he discovers whether the report was true or not. A ￿rm which was
sampled is punished with an arbitrarily small ￿ne if and only if its report was false.
This mechanism has several important features. First, it is very simple, and therefore applica-
ble in practice. In fact, as we will discuss later in more depth, it is very similar to the mechanism
actually used in several countries, including the United States￿National Pollutant Discharge Elim-
ination System. Second, it fully implements truth telling by the ￿rms, and results in the regulator
setting the e¢ cient standard in each industry. That is, since the unique equilibrium of this game is
for ￿rms to tell the truth, the informational asymmetry disappears, and the total welfare of society
is maximized. Finally, a third advantage of the mechanism is that it is budget balanced: it implies
no costs for the regulator.
There are other studies that have proposed mechanisms that both implement truth telling by
the ￿rms and result in an e¢ cient level of pollution. The two most relevant works in this area are:
Kwerel (1977) who obtains truth telling as one of potentially many equilibria when the regulator
sells pollution licenses (which are assumed to be traded in a perfectly competitive market) and
subsidizes ￿rms which buy them in excess of their needs; Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980)
who use the Groves-Clarke mechanism to obtain dominant strategy truth telling with an unbalanced
budget. Spulber (1988) presents a mechanism that, contrary to what happens with ours, does not
attain the ￿rst best outcomes. There are a few problems with these prior studies, the main one
being that one does not observe the proposed mechanisms in practice. We believe that there are two
main reasons why those mechanisms are not observed in reality. Moreover, our mechanism is free
of those problems. The ￿rst reason why we don￿ t observe those mechanisms in reality is that they
are complicated. This has been a standard criticism about the literature of optimal mechanism
design. We believe that another reason why previously proposed mechanisms are not observed
is that they are based on taxes, subsidies, or tradeable permits and these types of instruments
2have several implementation problems as compared to classic ￿command and control￿instruments.
Although these types of instruments have been used recently, they have applied only in very speci￿c
contexts, and their implementation has been slow for several reasons. For example, regulators are
not educated in environmental economics and do not see the advantages of these instruments in
terms of cost-e⁄ectiveness and e¢ ciency; they see ￿command-and-control￿instruments as stronger
statements of support for environmental protection. Moreover, regulators usually think that it is
immoral to let ￿rms pollute just because they paid some taxes, or because they purchased pollution
permits. Policymakers may also be reluctant to impose further costs on ￿rms because of the impact
on employment. Also, incentive-based instruments shift control decisions from regulatory sta⁄ to
polluting ￿rms, possibly a⁄ecting the regulator￿ s job security and prestige.1
Another problem with the existing theorems in the literature, is that they focus on whether
truth telling is a Nash equilibrium of the revelation game, and not on whether truth telling is the
unique equilibrium. If declaring large abatement costs is an equilibrium that yields higher pro￿ts
for all ￿rms, one will not observe ￿rms telling the truth, but rather overestimating their costs. Our
theorem is free from that problem, since its unique equilibrium is truth telling.2
Section 6 discusses the relationships among our mechanism and those in the literature on im-
plementation, but it su¢ ces here to stress two points. First, the implementability of the regulator￿ s
rule in our setting does not follow from any of the existing theorems. Second, and most important,
our focus is not on the novelty of the theoretical arguments in the implementation of the regulator￿ s
rule, but on the possibility of actually implementing it in real contexts.
We have argued that our mechanism is simple, shares some features of some regulatory prac-
tices around the world, implements truth telling and the e¢ cient level of pollution, and is budget
balanced. Also, we have argued that one of the reasons why one does not observe in practice
alternative mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature is because they were complicated
and relied on taxes and subsidies, which may be too di¢ cult to implement for regulators. We now
turn to the discussion of our assumptions.
2 Discussion of Assumptions
Our model is very similar to that in Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta et al. (1980). In some dimensions
our model is more general, and the conclusion of the theorem is stronger, but we make two additional
1These and other arguments are well documented in the literature. See for example Bohm and Russell (1985) ‚
Russell and Powell (1996), Lewis (1996), Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1998).
2Dasgupta et al. also criticize Kwerel for the assumption that permits are traded in perfectly competitive markets
and because of the weak ￿implementation￿concept: that truth telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An additional
problem of Kwerel is that his regulator has an unbalanced budget. In Dasgupta et al., if one requires a balanced
budget one only obtains that truth telling is a Bayes Nash equilibrium (and neither uniqueness, nor dominant strategy
implementation).
3assumptions.3 First, we assume that if the regulator samples one ￿rm, it can ￿nd out, with
probability "; for " arbitrarily small, whether the report of abatement costs was true or not. Second,
we assume that in each of m industries there are at least two ￿rms with the same cost functions.
With the ￿rst assumption the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the ￿rms
ceases to be absolute. The assumption is quite weak for at least three reasons. First, we assume
that the regulator inspects and samples just one ￿rm out of a potentially large pool. Second, we
assume that in case the inspection is successful and it provides some information, the regulator
only learns whether the report was true or not, but in case of a false report, he does not get to
know the true cost function. Third, and most important, the regulator only ￿nds out whether the
report is true or not with an arbitrarily small chance. That is, we ￿x any " > 0; and the regulator
only learns whether the report is true with probability ":
Our assumption that the asymmetry of information is not absolute is also a reasonable one in the
context we study. First, regulators worldwide engage in controlling or monitoring the statements
of polluters about the abatement technology to be used, so our assumption re￿ ects a common
practice. In the US for example, before starting their operations ￿rms are required to present
an exhaustive description of their production processes, abatement technology and costs in order
to obtain a pollution discharge permit.4 Second, this common practice is well founded, since the
regulators can check each piece of information provided by the ￿rm, and assess its validity, or
even in some cases be more proactive by pointing out to ￿rms how other businesses have coped
with the same abatement problems. Engineers from the Environmental Protection Agency study
the di⁄erent abatement technologies available to a particular type of industrial activity and then
establish e› uent standards for each category of polluter and place of discharge (see Field, 1997).
Since the regulation, and the standard-setting, occur at a basic ￿process level￿and not at a more
complicated ￿plant-level,￿the processes involved are standard across industries, and the regulator
has a deep knowledge about costs as illustrated, for example, in the following quotation from the
Environmental Protection Agency (1992).
￿The document provides a generic process-by-process assessment of pollution prevention
opportunities for the Kraft segment of the pulp and paper industry. The process areas
covered are: wood yard operations, pulping and chemical recovery, pulp bleaching, pulp
drying and papermaking, and wastewater treatment. These process areas are further
broken down by speci￿c process (e.g., oxygen deligni￿cation as one speci￿c process
under the pulping and chemical recovery area). For each speci￿c process there is a
3Like both these works, our model can be applied more generally, and not just to the problem of a regulator trying
to ￿x the right level of pollution.
4Several countries have copied extensively the US National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, including our
own Uruguay. Most of such systems share the ￿inspection￿features of the US system that we are interested in.
4description, a cost estimate, a discussion of applicability, and estimate of environmental
bene￿ts.￿ 5
Both the way the regulatory process takes place, and the depth of the knowledge of the regulator
about each individual process suggest that the asymmetry of information between ￿rms and the
regulators is not absolute, so that our assumption seems appropriate.
Our second assumption, that there are at least two ￿rms in each industry which have identi-
cal cost functions also follows from the way the regulatory process works (i.e. setting emissions
standards on a process by process basis). If a ￿rm buys cows and delivers leather shoes, it won￿ t
have the same abatement costs as a ￿rm that buys cows and delivers leather seats for cars. But
both ￿rms will ￿rst produce raw hides and then tan the leather. Since both ￿rms need to abate its
pollution levels at each individual task, each of which is also undertaken in other ￿rms producing
di⁄erent goods, our assumption re￿ ects the fact that even very complicated production processes
are based on some elementary processes that are repeated in several ￿rms even across industries.
Another reason why the assumption of at least two ￿rms per industry is not so restrictive is that
our exact same model would apply if it was common knowledge that costs in the same industry
are just ￿vertical￿translations of each other. That is, if ￿rm 1 has a cost function of c; and ￿rm 2
a cost function of c + k, those cost functions are ￿identical￿as far as our mechanism is concerned.
Therefore, if a ￿rm in California and a ￿rm in New York buy their abatement technology from a
￿rm in New York, and the price in California is just the price in New York plus shipping, those
two ￿rms can be modeled as having identical costs. Finally, as we will argue in Section 5, even if
there are some ￿rms that have cost functions that no other ￿rm in the whole economy share, our
mechanism can still be used. Suppose that the regulator can estimate the cost functions of these
￿rms and produce estimates which are ￿close￿to the truth. Then, the unique equilibrium of our
mechanism (when it is applied among the ￿rms in industries with at least two ￿rms) is still truth
telling, and the standards set for each industry are ￿close￿to the ￿rst-best, complete information,
ones.
Another, less disputable, assumption that we make is that the regulator can ￿ne the ￿rms
for lying. This is consistent with the practice of pollution regulators worldwide. In Uruguay, for
example, as a consequence of ￿forgery￿in the cost declaration, the person in charge of ￿lling the
reports about the abatement technology can be imprisoned. Another potential punishment is the
temporary closing of the plant. Similar practices are common elsewhere. It is worth emphasizing
that for our mechanism to work, the ￿ne can be arbitrarily small. If ￿nes were large, even a small
probability of a false report being uncovered would su¢ ce to make truth telling a dominant strategy.
In our mechanism the ￿ne is used exclusively for breaking ties.
5Similar quotations can be found for other industries. See for example EPA (2002) for the iron and steel industries
and their process by process regulation.
5We also assume that total damages to society are known or can be estimated. Although this
has been the standard assumption in this branch of the literature (see Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta
et al., 1980) it is quite strong. As we will argue later, however, our mechanism is robust to
whether the regulator knows total damages exactly, or approximately, or just wants to set a total
level of emissions for the whole economy. The ￿rst extension is relevant if one is able to estimate
total damages to society approximately, and is concerned that the emissions standards will be
approximately correct. We show that that is indeed the case: our mechanism still fully implements
truth telling, and if the regulator￿ s estimate of total damages are close to the true damages, then the
emissions standards that result from our mechanism are close to the ones that would be implemented
if the regulator knew exactly the damages to society and abatement costs. In a second relaxation of
the assumption that the regulator knows damages, we investigate how our mechanism fares when
the regulator does not know, or is not interested in, damages to society, but rather on achieving a
certain level of emissions for the whole economy. This extension is important because in practice it
is common to proceed in that way. Moreover, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol implies that the
regulatory agencies must ￿nd the most e¢ cient way to achieve a certain level of emissions for the
economy as a whole. We show that our mechanism can be used to determine the standards which
minimize the total cost to society of complying with, say, the Kyoto standards.
In this note we are only concerned with the problem of setting the right emissions standards. The
enforcement of those standards is a di⁄erent issue, and we therefore omit its study. Our mechanism
does not assume that there is perfect enforcement, only that higher emissions standards are better
for ￿rms. If there is perfect enforcement, then our mechanism maximizes total welfare to society. If
there isn￿ t, the emissions standards are the correct ones, but if ￿rms violate the standards, welfare
is not maximized, and the regulator must try to maximize compliance subject to its enforcement
budget (see footnote 8 for more on this issue).
3 The Model
There are m industries and ni, for i = 1;:::;m, ￿rms in each industry: Firms in I1 =
￿
1;:::;n1￿
are those in industry 1; ￿rms in I2 =
￿
n1 + 1;:::;n1 + n2￿
are those in industry 2 and so on. Each
industry has at least 2 ￿rms.
The total damages to society coming from pollution are a convex and twice di⁄erentiable func-
tion D : R+ ! R+, with D0;D00 > 0; where total damages are given by D(X) and X is the total








As is standard in this branch of the literature, we make the strong assumption that the regulator
knows or is able to estimate D(X); but we relax this assumption in Section 5.2. This simpli￿cation
6is aimed at focusing on the problems that arise due to the asymmetric information between the
regulator and the ￿rms. Also, this de￿nition of damages also assumes that what matters is the total
level of pollution, and not its geographic distribution. Although this assumption is not essential
for our mechanism to work, it can be justi￿ed on the grounds that the pollutant to be regulated is
￿uniformly mixed￿in the sense that only the amounts emitted are relevant, and not their place of
generation.6
Let C be the set of all functions c such that c0 (x) is negative, strictly increasing and for all x
D0 (x) + c0 (0) < 0:7 (1)
Each ￿rm in industry i can abate its pollution level using an abatement technology which has a
cost of ci (￿) 2 C: That is, ci (xj) for ￿rm j polluting a level xj in industry i is the di⁄erence in
pro￿ts from (a) not engaging in abatement, and (b) abating its potential pollution to level xj:8
Note that all ￿rms in each industry have the same cost function.
Before continuing with the presentation of the model, we remark that the assumptions made
so far about D and the set of possible cost functions of the ￿rms are the same as the ones that
have been used in the papers most related to this. In particular, Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta et
al (1980) both assume known damages. Kwerel also assumes convex di⁄erentiable D and c￿ s, and
an analogue of (1). Dasgupta et al. do not assume convexity, but do assume that there exists a
unique minimum for the problem of the regulator, which is all we use of the convexity conditions
and equation (1). Therefore, our assumptions so far are equivalent to the ones in the relevant
literature.
The cost function ci of ￿rm i is unknown to the regulator. He only knows that ci 2 C for
i = 1;:::;m and that the pro￿le c =
￿
c1;c2;:::;cm￿
is drawn from Cm using some probability
distribution P which is common knowledge. In the mechanism of this paper, the regulator asks
￿rms to report their cost functions. In spite of the informational asymmetry, the regulator can
inspect one ￿rm. With probability " > 0 he ￿nds out whether the report was truthful or not, with
probability 1￿" the inspection is inconclusive. In case the regulator discovers that the report was
not true, he does not ￿nd out the true ci; but only that the report was false.
In this context, a social choice function is a function f : Cm ! Rm
+ that speci￿es for each
possible pro￿le of cost functions (one for each industry) the pollution level that each ￿rm must
6Less importantly, it is the standard assumption in this strand of the literature.
7This assumption rules out the possibility that ￿rms declare a cost function that would make the optimal standard
for that industry equal to 0: It is a reasonable assumption for regulation of industries or processes that are already
functioning, since it just re￿ ects the fact that regulators have chosen not to prohibit those industries or processes.
8If c
i (xj) is interpreted as the cost of abating pollution to xj; one is implicitly assuming that there is perfect
enforcement, and therefore our mechanism will maximize total welfare. If c
i (xj) is interpreted as the cost of having
a standard of xj; one is not assuming perfect enforcement, only that higher standards are better. In that case, our
mechanism sets the right standard, but eschews the issue of whether they will be enforced.
7produce. The regulator wishes to implement the social choice function that minimizes the total
cost of pollution. Technically, given our convexity assumptions, f is the function f : Cm ! Rm
+
de￿ned by












for all c =
￿
c1;:::;cm￿
2 Cm; where xi is the standard set for industry i; with which all ￿rms in
the industry must comply. As was argued earlier, the only role of our convexity assumptions is to
make the arg min in equation (2) unique.
When c in equation (2) is the true pro￿le of cost functions, the function f yields the ￿rst
best emission levels: the emission levels that the regulator would choose if he knew the true cost
functions. In this paper we will show that our mechanism allows the regulator to ￿nd out the true
pro￿le of cost functions c; and therefore ￿nd the ￿rst best emission levels. We will not, however,
deal with the problem of ￿nding the best allocations for the whole economy, when ￿rms pay to
consumers the damage caused. In the problem of ￿nding this optimal allocation when ￿rms have
to pay the damage caused, some polluting ￿rms could be forced to close down due to losses. This
di⁄erence is relevant because, among other things, regulatory agencies in some countries care about
the impact of their regulation on the probability of inducing ￿rms to close down. Nevertheless, our
take on this problem is the standard one in the literature on Environmental Economics (including
the papers most related to ours).
It is also worth noting that since our model is static, and we do not include a player that can
enforce collusive agreements (as is sometimes done in static collusion games), we are eschewing
the problem of collusion among ￿rms. In our static model, the unique equilibrium is truth telling,
but if the game of ￿standard setting￿were repeated an in￿nite number of times, other equilibria
(including a collusive outcome in which ￿rms claim high abatement costs) could arise. Since
collusion is a widespread problem, it is a drawback of our model. But because we lack a decent
theory of equilibrium selection for in￿nitely repeated games, the same can be said of any static
mechanism. Therefore, if collusion is strongly suspected in the regulation of some pollutant (if
there are few ￿rms, for example) the best alternative may be the method that has been used the
most in the past: estimation of cost functions by the regulator.
4 The Mechanism and the Theorem
We now present our mechanism, and then show that it fully implements f: That is, we will show
that in the unique equilibrium of the game designed by the regulator, ￿rms truthfully disclose their
cost functions.
For our direct revelation mechanism, the strategy space for each ￿rm is C: Firms must announce

































j is the emissions standard that would result for industry 1 if the regulator
believed the announcement of ￿rm j in this industry; and chose the announcement of a ￿rm pi in
each remaining industry i 6= j which would result in the most stringent standard for industry 1: A
￿rm with a low x1
j is most likely telling the truth, since it is announcing a cost function that could
result in a harsh environmental policy. Similarly, de￿ne xi
j for i = 2;:::;m and j 2 Ii to be the
standard that would be implemented for industry i if the regulator believed the announcement of
￿rm j in that industry. Also, de￿ne
xi = min
j2Ii xi
j and xi = max
j2Ii xi
j (4)
to be, respectively, the most (least) stringent standard consistent with the announcements of ￿rms
in industry i:
Our mechanism is as follows:
1. Firms announce their types
2. If in industry i announcements coincide, the regulator samples randomly one of the ￿rms
and inspects it. If the announcements do not all coincide, the regulator: identi￿es the ￿rms,
or ￿rm, which announced the cost functions which are consistent with xi; randomly selects




=ni; and some other ￿rm
with probability 1￿￿: The idea is to monitor ￿rms which are most likely lying with a larger
probability. A ￿rm is ￿ned if and only if: it is sampled; its report is false; the inspection
discovers (with probability ") that the report was false. The size of the ￿ne does not matter,
it can be as small as one wants.




A strategy for a ￿rm in the game that this mechanism de￿nes is a continuous function s : C ! C
that announces a cost function for each possible type (real cost function) of the ￿rm. We now present
our main result.
9Theorem 1. The e¢ cient (￿rst best, full information) social choice function f de￿ned by equation
(2) is fully implementable. That is, the unique equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism, is
truth telling.
The proof is in the appendix.
Remark 1. It is worth emphasizing that our mechanism has a unique equilibrium. Using assump-
tions similar to ours (except for auditing and two ￿rms per industry) Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta
et al. (1980) study the issue of whether truth telling is an equilibrium.9 The issue of uniqueness and
whether truth telling is the only equilibrium is not analyzed. As has been argued in the literature on
mechanism design the issue of multiplicity is very relevant, especially if the equilibria arising from
the game can be Pareto ranked, and it becomes focal to lie. See Moore (1992) p. 186, fn. 5 and the
references therein.
Remark 2. The central idea of the proof is very simple (which may also help in the actual
implementation of the mechanism). First, if one ￿rm is telling the truth, it is optimal for all to
tell the truth, since they will relax the standard, and reduce the probability of a ￿ne (to 0). That
shows that truth telling is an equilibrium. Second, if all ￿rms are lying, one will have an expected
probability of inspection which is larger than the rest. That ￿rm has an incentive to slightly undercut
all other ￿rms in its announcement, since it will strictly reduce the chance of an inspection and
change the standard only slightly.
From Remark 2 one can see that if one is willing to use a stronger equilibrium concept, in
particular, trembling hand perfection, then one can simplify the mechanism even further by elimi-
nating the probability of the inspection of the ￿rms which are not declaring xi. That inspection is
used to get rid of equilibria in which in some industry one or more ￿rms declare the truth, and two
or more ￿rms declare cost functions which yield standards that are more stringent than the ones
corresponding to the truth. Without these inspections, those ￿rms have no incentive to deviate,
since the standard will be very low (stringent) even if they declare the truth, and they are not ￿ned
if they lie. If one took a ￿nite type space, and all ￿rms mixed on all of their types, there would
always be a chance that a ￿rm would be the only one declaring the cost function consistent with
the low standard, and it would then be a best response to play the truth.10
From a practical point of view, the application of the mechanism as it is may present two
di¢ culties. First, the type space may be too large, and it may be too hard for ￿rms to estimate
9In Dasgupta et al., when the budget is not required to be balanced, their version of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
is implementable in dominant strategies. If one requires balanced budget, as we do, they only obtain that truth
telling is an equilibrium. In Kwerel the budget is not balanced and uniqueness does not obtain.
10The size of the type space would have to be fairly large for the small " and small ￿ne to be enough incentive for
￿rms to undercut each other.
10exactly which is its cost function. Second, and related to the previous point, two ￿rms ￿trying￿to
declare the truth may not declare the exact same cost function, and it would not make much sense
to punish them in that case. A solution to both of these problems is to present the ￿rms with a
fairly large (but ￿nite) menu of cost functions that can be declared, and the authority deems the
statement to be true if it is close enough to the truth (the inspection, instead of declaring truth or
not, would declare whether the statement is close to the truth or not, which is even easier for the
regulator).11
It is worth noting that our mechanism can also be used to elicit the optimal Pigouvian taxes.12
In that case, the regulator still wishes to implement f from equation (2). If he knew the true
cost functions c; he would calculate x =
￿
x1;:::;xm￿
; then he would set t = D0 ￿P
nixi￿
: Then,
the ￿rms￿problem in industry i would be to choose x to minimize c(x) + tx; so that the optimal
emission would be characterized by





Since this is the ￿rst order condition of the regulator￿ s problem when choosing the optimal x; we
see that the ￿rm￿ s problem yields the ￿rst best levels of pollution.
In order to use our mechanism to implement f via taxes, the regulator would calculate (as
before) for each ￿rm j in industry i; the highest tax rate consistent with the ￿rm￿ s declaration.
Then, he would calculate for each industry i; t
i = maxti
j and ti = minti
j: Then, in the mechanism,
t
i would play the role of xi and ti the role of xi:
5 Di⁄erent Assumptions
In this Section we brie￿ y discuss three variants of our assumptions and of the mechanism that
still fully implement truth telling. This is relevant since the institutional settings may vary from
country to country, making some versions impossible to implement, while rendering others feasible.
These extensions are simple applications of the main idea behind our Theorem, and this simplicity
just illustrates how powerful our basic mechanism is.
Before turning to the variations of the model, we note that our two main assumptions are
necessary for the mechanism to fully implement truthtelling. If the regulator had no way of ￿nding
out whether the ￿rms are lying, the following would be an equilibrium. Suppose there is a maximum
11One choice of a ￿nite type space for which the unique equilibrium is telling the closest ￿declarable type￿to the
truth is the following. Partition the interval [0;M]; for large M into intervals of length 1: The menu of cost functions
that can be declared is that of costs which have constant derivative in those intervals, and the derivative is a multiple
of 1=K (for large K). The mechanism is the same, only that the regulator declares a ￿rm to be lying if its declaration
is not close enough to the truth (with the metric of the supremum).
12We do not pursue this route here, because of their reduced applicability, discussed in the introduction.
11potential pollution level in each industry Xi (when ￿rms do not engage in abatement), and that










and the regulator then sets the non binding standard Xi in industry i: Also, note that even if the
regulator could ￿nd out whether a report was true with probability "; as in our model, if a ￿rm
were alone in the industry, it would maximize pro￿ts by declaring a cost function that yields Xi as
its standard, provided " and the ￿ne are su¢ ciently small.
There are several variants of the mechanism that also yield truthtelling as the unique equilib-
rium. Here we analyze two. The ￿rst variant is concerned with our main assumption: that there
are at least two ￿rms in each industry. The second analyzes the case where damages to society are
unknown, or there is no interest in determining them.
5.1 Industries with one ￿rm.
Suppose industries 1 through k have just one ￿rm, n1 = n2 = ::: = nk = 1; and that industries k+1
through k + m have at least two ￿rms, as has been our assumption so far. As before, we let Ii be
the set of indexes of ￿rms in industry i; even for industries with 1 ￿rm. Again, the regulator wishes
to implement the social choice function that minimizes the net cost of pollution. Technically, he
wishes to implement the function f : Ck+m ! Rk+m
+ de￿ned by












for all c =
￿
c1;:::;ck+m￿
2 Ck+m. We endow C with the sup norm.
Suppose that the regulator can estimate, not necessarily exactly, the cost functions of industries
1 through k and call b ci those estimates. As before, the regulator will ask ￿rms in industries k + 1
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: pi 2 Ik+i;i = 2;:::;m
￿
and similarly for industries k + 2 through k + m: The de￿nitions of xi and xi are as before, from
equation (4).
Consider the following mechanism:
121. The regulator estimates a cost function b ci for ￿rms in industries i = 1;:::;k:
2. Firms in industries k + 1 through k + m announce their types
3. If in industry i = k + 1;:::;k + m announcements coincide, the regulator samples randomly
one of the ￿rms and inspects it. If the announcements do not all coincide, the regulator:
identi￿es the ￿rms, or ￿rm, which announced the cost functions which are consistent with xi;





some other ￿rm with probability 1￿￿: A ￿rm is ￿ned if and only if: it is sampled; its report
is false; the inspection discovers (with probability ") that the report was false..
4. The emissions standards
￿
b x1;:::; b xk;xk+1;:::;xk+m￿
are implemented.
Theorem 2. For any estimates
￿
b c1;:::;b ck￿
the unique equilibrium of the direct revelation mecha-
nism, is truth telling. Moreover, the standards
￿




so that if the estimated
￿
b c1;:::;b ck￿
are close to the truth, the standards in all industries will be close
to the ￿rst best standards.
Proof. The proof that the unique equilibrium is truth telling mirrors exactly the proof of Theorem
1, and is therefore omitted.
Continuity of the standards follows from applying Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis
and Border (1999), p. 539) to F (c) in equation (5): when
￿
ck+1;:::;ck+m￿























: Then, the set x(b c) of minimizers of (6) is upper
hemicontinuous, and therefore continuous, as was to be shown.
5.2 Unknown Damages
In this section we consider two extensions to our basic model that address the question of whether
our mechanism works when either D is unknown, or irrelevant.
Suppose ￿rst that the regulator is able to estimate D: Then, as in the previous section, we have
that the mechanism works, and that if the estimate of D is accurate, the emissions standards will
be close to the complete information ones.
Theorem 3. For any estimate b D the unique equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism of
Section 4, is truth telling. Moreover, the standards are continuous in b D so that if the estimated b D
is close to the truth, the standards in all industries will be close to the ￿rst best standards.
13The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 2, and is therefore omitted.
Another extension of the model that is relevant is one in which total damages to society are
irrelevant. Consider the case of a country that wants to achieve a certain level of pollution X in
the most e¢ cient way. This could be the case, for example, of countries that adopted the Kyoto
Protocol: they have committed to achieving by 2012 a certain level of emissions. Europe, for
instance, must abate its 1990 levels of green house gases by 8%. The problem of the regulator is
therefore to ￿nd the standards for each industry that minimize the total costs of abatement, and














Then, the regulator wants to implement f from






We have that our mechanism still implements truth telling, and this results in the complete infor-
mation standards for this problem.
Theorem 4. For any X the unique equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism of Section 4,
is truth telling.
The proof is identical to that of Theorem 1, and is therefore omitted.
6 On the Novelty of Our Theorems
We believe that the main merit of our results is their applicability given the simplicity of the
mechanism and of the proof, which makes it ￿likely￿that players will understand their incentives.13
In particular, we do not use some of the standard techniques, like cross reporting, used in the
literature on implementation with complete information. Nevertheless, in this section we argue
that our results are new, and discuss the relationship with the literature on mechanism design.
First, our results do not follow from any of the existing theorems in the literature. That is,
there is no theorem that ensures that the social choice correspondence de￿ned by equation 2, or
any selection from it, is fully implementable in Nash equilibrium. The results in Jackson, Palfrey
and Srivastava (1994) do not apply either to our mechanism, or to the simpler version in which
there is only one industry and two ￿rms. Most importantly, their theorems are for implementation
in undominated Nash, and our results are full Nash implementation (we get uniqueness without
requiring that the strategies be undominated). Moreover, their Theorem 1 is for three or more
13We thank Matt Jackson for many of the references in this Section, and for his comments regarding the importance
of the simplicity of the mechanism and the proof.
14￿rms, and their Theorem 3 requires the existence of a ￿worse outcome￿that is not present in our
setup.14
Second, although inspections and ￿nes have been used in the past and it is ￿known￿that they
help in the implementation problem, our assumptions are weaker and di⁄erent than the ones that
have been used before. For example, the important works of Mookherjee and P￿ ng (1989) and
Ortuæo-Ortin and Roemer (1993) used costly but perfectly informative inspections and sizeable
￿nes. Our inspections can be as uninformative as one wants, and the ￿nes can be arbitrarily small.
Arya and Glover (2005) use a public signal that may be only slightly correlated with the player￿ s
reports to implement truth telling (to the owner of a ￿rm) by a manager and his auditor. In their
model, however, ￿nes for lying can be large.
Finally, our results are not subject to the criticisms to full implementation in complete infor-
mation that have been raised by Chung and Ely (2003), since our setup is, in their terminology,
one of ￿private values￿ .
7 Summary
We have presented a mechanism that may help in solving the important problem of how to get
polluters to tell the truth about their abatement costs. Our solution is simple, shares some features
of how the actual regulatory process works in the US and other places, it implements truth telling
by ￿rms and the e¢ cient level of pollution. Also, we have argued that one of the reasons why one
does not observe in practice alternative mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature is
because they were complicated and relied on taxes and subsidies, which may be too di¢ cult to
implement for regulators.
Our main assumption is that there are at least two ￿rms in each industry. We have argued
that this is a reasonable assumption, and we have shown how our mechanism can still be used even
when that assumption is not satis￿ed.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Truth Telling is an Equilibrium. We ￿rst show that truth telling is
an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, consider the situation of ￿rm 1 when all other ￿rms in
all industries are reporting the true costs
￿
c1;c2;:::;cm￿
. Notice that declaring the true c1 leads to
the implementation of x1
2 = ::: = x1
n1 consistent with all the declarations of ￿rms 2 through n1: If
￿rm 1 reports b c1 6= c1; two things could happen, depending on the pro￿le of types announced by
14A worse outcome in that setting would be a standard of 0 and for each ￿rm a lottery which yields the ￿ne with
probabilty ": We do not need to include such an outcome in our space of allocations for our mechanism to work. Our




j for all j = 2;:::;nj: In this case the same standard is implemented in industry 1; and
the ￿rm could be ￿ned.
￿ x1
1 < x1
j for all j = 2;:::;nj: In this case, a harsher standard is implemented for industry 1.
Since, no matter what is the pro￿le of types announced in the other industries, ￿rm 1 is worse
o⁄ deviating, and hence, declaring the truth is better than declaring anything else, proving that
truth telling is an equilibrium.














lie for some ci
lie 2 C in the support of Pi (the
probability distribution over industry i￿ s types induced by P) and suppose it is an equilibrium.
That is, suppose there is an equilibrium without truth telling. Without loss of generality, suppose




the pro￿le of announcements C =
￿
C1;C2;:::;Cm￿
(see equation (3)) is such that not all ￿rms in industry 1 are telling the truth. Notice that all
announcement in C1 are lies, since if one ￿rm were telling the truth all ￿rms would be strictly
better o⁄ telling the truth, since (relative to lying) they would weakly increase the standard for
the industry, and strictly reduce the chance of being ￿ned (to 0). Since one ￿rm is inspected the
average chance of a ￿rm being inspected is 1=n1: Take any ￿rm that in state c1
lie has a probability
p (depending on other ￿rms￿declarations) of being inspected which is (weakly) larger than 1=n1:
Suppose it is ￿rm 1:







depend on: the strategies
si
j of the ￿rms j in other industries i and on their types ci (true cost functions): If, given si
j for
￿rms j in other industries i, ￿rm 1 in industry 1 can ensure that for all of the types of the other
industries x1







; then the probability
of inspection when c1




. That way, it reduces the






which corresponds to the probability of being inspected for a ￿rm that claimed a standard di⁄erent
from the maximum. Since ￿rm 1 was lying, it will be strictly better o⁄ with that deviation (by
strictly reducing the chance of being inspected and ￿ned). To establish the existence of such a
deviation, notice that if the ￿rms in industry 1 were declaring cost functions fb c1;b c2;:::;b cn1g ￿rm 1
can always declare a e c de￿ned by




for ￿ < 1; close enough to 1: Such a e c is in C (it has a negative and strictly increasing ￿rst
derivative) so we now show that it yields a strictly higher utility for ￿rm 1 by showing that any




a smaller standard for industry 1, and that standard corresponds to the declaration e c1 of ￿rm 1.










The assumptions that D and all cs are di⁄erentiable, and D0 (x)+c0 (0) < 0 for all c ensure that
the solution of the regulator￿ s problem is interior, and hence the ￿rst order condition of the problem
of the regulator is satis￿ed. Now ￿x any pro￿le of types c (one for each industry) for which c1 = c1
lie;






(one ￿rm￿ s declaration per industry) and the ￿rm j in industry 1 such that x1 = x1
j: When choosing
x1




























Convexity of D and e c imply that for this combination of declarations in the other industries, the
standard set by ￿rm 1 will be lower. Moreover, by the Theorem of the Maximum, and uniqueness
of the optimal x (a consequence of the strict convexity of the cs) the new standard corresponding








We have proved that if c1
lie occurs, ￿rm 1 is strictly better o⁄ deviating. Since strategies are
continuous, the same analysis can be conducted for types c1 close to c1
lie: Since c1
lie is in the support
of the distribution of types for industry 1; there is a positive probability of types for which ￿rm 1
is strictly better deviating from the proposed equilibrium, and that is a contradiction.
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